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THINKING BEYOND DEMOCRACY FOR A FUTURE COSMOPOLITAN LEGAL ORDER
by
THOMAS DALTON BRIGGS
Under the Direction of  S.M. Love, PhD
ABSTRACT
Recent decades have seen sustained theoretical interest in how a cosmopolitan legal order 
could be created in a manner consistent with the liberal human rights ideals and democratic 
principles it is supposed to realize.  I argue that this “democratic cosmopolitan” account of  the 
genesis of  cosmopolitan law faces at least two dilemmas.  Both concern the role that “learning 
processes” play in its explanation of  how a genuine cosmopolitan legal order can emerge from a 
global transformation in the meaning of  sovereignty and citizenship.  The first dilemma is the 
theory’s reliance on underdeveloped sociological claims about the nature of  democratic political 
processes, while the second concerns its one-sided analysis of  how global trade and interdependence 
might produce a kind of  “cosmopolitan learning.”  In light of  these issues, I propose that 
cosmopolitan theorists think beyond democracy as an ideal that should strictly guide the creation of  a 
cosmopolitan legal order.
INDEX WORDS: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy, State, Law, International law, Kant
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1 REALIZING COSMOPOLITAN RIGHT
Recent history has renewed the great “cosmopolitan debate,” with some key historical events 
giving ammunition to both sides.  On one hand, beginning with the end of  the Cold War and the fall 
of  the USSR, many saw an opportunity appear—an opportunity to build certain global institutions 
that might bring international politics under the yoke of  law—the likes of  which had not been seen 
since the end of  the second World War, however brief  that opportunity turned out to be.  And yet 
the United States’ response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks quickly cast a shadow over these nascent 
cosmopolitan aspirations, calling into question the liberal internationalism that, to many, was 
beginning to serve as a mere veil for the power politics of  the Western, United States-led order.
A key element of  this back-and-forth between cosmopolitanism and its critics concerns the 
cosmopolitan legal project, that is, the question of  how a universal, international system of  law 
founded upon human rights principles could be established in a way consistent with the democratic 
principles of  self-determination to which cosmopolitanism is also committed.  It is this debate that 
is the present concern of  this thesis.  The authors discussed herein, for the most part, offer a 
particular account of  this genesis of  cosmopolitan law that I will call “democratic 
cosmopolitanism.”  And it is this general theory that I will critique.  To do so effectively, I think, 
requires that we start with the cosmopolitanism of  Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century philosopher 
whose work inaugurates the tradition from which contemporary cosmopolitans draw.
Two years after publishing Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant declares the "ultimate goal of  the 
whole right of  nations"—perpetual peace itself—to be "indeed an unachievable idea."1  Despite 
practical reason demanding both individuals and states to leave the state of  nature and the condition 
of  war therein, the best we can aspire to is but a mere "continual approximation" of  the political 
principles of  peace.  To understand the democratic cosmopolitans' project we will examine two 
1 Kant 1797: §61.
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questions they ask of  Kant's cosmopolitanism.  The first question concerns why Kant abandoned 
the original project of  establishing a genuine cosmopolitan legal order, i.e., a law based on principles 
of  peace and human rights capable of  binding nation-states; the second, how his account fails and 
what conceptual revisions are necessary for its present revival.
1.1 Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and its Failure
Kant's account of  the origin of  law is in some important ways a familiar one.  The state of  nature 
(i.e. war) among pre-civil individuals is one they ought to leave, because the uncertainty and danger 
therein make realizing right impossible.  Leaving this condition requires a legal order founded on an 
innate right to freedom all possess in virtue of  their being human.2  It is not wrong to coerce others 
into this legal order if  they refuse to join because without it right is impossible—that is, any coercion 
required to bring people out of  a state of  nature is not (necessarily) unjust because the state of  
nature itself  is a condition of  injustice.3  The solution to war among states and the international 
state of  nature, we might think, would be an analogous creation of  a world state that lifts individuals 
and states out from under the global threat of  war.  Kant rejects this world state solution on practical 
and theoretical grounds.  Practically, "the size of  such a state of  nations would make protecting each 
member impossible,"4  with tyranny inevitably arising from the bloated body of  a global Leviathan.  
Theoretically, however, there is another issue: despite how both the pre-civil and the international 
states of  nature threaten human right generally with the possibility of  war, coercion is not a rightful 
solution for the international problem.  Unlike individuals in the pre-civil state of  nature, states 
"already have a rightful constitution internally" and have thus "outgrown" the efforts of  others to 
impose their own idea of  right upon them.5  Even though practical reason still demands states leave 
2 Kant 1797: 6:237.
3 See Kant 1797: 6:312 and 6:350
4 Kant 1797: 6:350.
5 See Kant 1795: 8:355 and Kant 1797: 6:344.
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their lawless condition, history, for Kant, makes clear their general refusal to do so.  In light of  this 
fact Kant replaces the original positive vision of  a coercive world republic with "the negative 
surrogate of  a league," wherein states voluntarily covenant to avoid war and establish peace through 
mutual cooperation.6
Kant was thus sensitive to two common objections to legal cosmopolitanism: concerns for 
the inability of  institutions of  such size and scope to be democratically legitimate,7 and the worry 
that the project is merely one people's vision of  right coercively imposed on others.  It turns out, 
though, that the democratic cosmopolitans' answer to the second question—why Kant's account 
fails and what can be done to revive it—will also be the basis for their response to the above 
objections.  But we must see, first, why they find Kant's voluntary league inadequate, and second, 
how they diagnose Kant's statist notion of  popular sovereignty to be the source of  his account's failures.  
The foundation of  the democratic cosmopolitan account of  a genuine legal order of  cosmopolitan 
right will be its reimagining of  this statist understanding of  popular sovereignty.  
The importance of  the cosmopolitan juridical project should be emphasized, because the actual 
realization and institutionalization of  cosmopolitan right is not merely an optimistic addendum to 
the general moral vision.  Rather, it is perhaps cosmopolitanism's most pressing theoretical task, for 
the general lack of  law capable of  binding states themselves remains a constant threat to human 
right even when it is realized (merely provisionally, however) in individual states.8  The distinction 
here can be thought along the lines of  that between classical international law and constitutionally 
bound domestic law.  Classical international law for the most part merely governed the relations 
between states, but only to the extent that both sovereign contracting parties allowed it to.  In such a 
system, as Habermas notes, war itself  was conceptually incapable of  itself  being a crime, as the jus 
6 Kant 1795: 8:357.
7 See Dahl 2010 and Rawls 1999.  For a contrasting view on this issue, see Nili 2015.
8 See Habermas 2008 and 2010; Held 1997 and 2010; and Benhabib 2007, 2012, and 2014.
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ad bellum was an absolute right constitutive of  a state’s sovereign legal status.9  Post-WW2 
developments in international law appeared to overturn this paradigm, at least partially, as war itself  
became criminalized and international politics began to see a meaningful process of  legalization.10  
Yet the foreign and domestic policy of  the United States in its present War on Terror legal paradigm 
is a stark reminder for the cosmopolitans that more is clearly needed to constrain international 
power politics.  Hence the inadequacy of  the voluntary league and its mere "continual 
approximation" of  the true cosmopolitan task.  Habermas captures the problem when he says that 
"Kant must still solve the conceptual problem of  how this order could be thought of  from the 
viewpoint of  law."11  Because Kant is unable to rely on coercion as a mechanism for realizing and 
enforcing cosmopolitan right, he must instead substitute each state's moral self-binding to the voluntary 
league for the legal binding that lies outside his conceptual grasp.12  A voluntary league is thus 
incapable of  realizing cosmopolitan right because each state is only provisionally bound by its own 
moral ideas; that the central question of  how states themselves can be brought together under law is 
answered with a facsimile of  legal order is more than just a practical concern, but a problem with 
Kant's idea of  cosmopolitanism itself.13
Kant's inability to think (popular) sovereignty beyond the form it was beginning to take on 
in his historical context—the form of  the nation-state—is, according to the democratic 
cosmopolitans, the source of  his account's failure.  It is, first, why the initial disanalogy between the 
pre-civil and international states of  nature proves an insurmountable obstacle to a straightforward 
juridification of  cosmopolitan right.  And while he recognized that practical reason demands states 
bind themselves to higher law, he nevertheless failed to imagine an international order outside the 
9 Habermas 2006: 119.
10 See Habermas 1997 and Finnemore 2004.
11 Habermas 1997: 116.
12 Habermas 1997: 118.
13 Habermas 1997: 118.
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horizon of  the nation-state, instead settling on the voluntary league as the highest order to which we 
can aspire.  Moreover, global-historical transformations that Kant couldn't have predicted cast 
further doubt on the possibility of  realizing popular sovereignty and human right in the form of  the 
nation-state.  Three global forces unleashed in the process of  industrialization and globalization are 
responsible: capitalism's international markets and the unrestrained movement of  capital it demands; 
ecological crises accelerated and magnified by industrialization; and finally, transnational migrations 
of  immigrants and refugees made more frequent and intense by the previous two forces.14  These 
forces challenge the ideal of  state sovereignty by dissolving the very distinction between a state's 
internal and external affairs—its domestic and foreign policy—constitutive of  the meaning of  
sovereignty.  State sovereignty and the self-determination of  a people were "internally linked," as 
Habermas puts it,15 for what it meant for a people to determine themselves was not just internal 
self-legislating, but also the defense and defining of  the community against those outside it.  The 
distinction, then, is what makes it possible to conceive of  "internal self-legislating" in the first place.16  Thus the 
modern concepts of  sovereignty and self-determination emerged already-wedded to notions of  
territory and identity that gave meaning to these concepts by providing their determinate form and 
content.  The modern forces of  globalization and global crises, however, defy territorial constraints 
and thus render the internal/external and foreign/domestic distinctions untenable from the point of  
view of  self-determination within a state.  I’ll return to this point in a moment.  But first let’s 
provisionally consider how: multinational corporations and the global market exist and operate 
outside any constraints a single state could possibly muster; ecological crises are issues that by their 
nature require collective, global solutions; and, finally, international migrations challenge the 
14 While this “death of the state” thesis actually remains quite a disputed one today, for the purposes of this 
paper I will not dispute the claims of the democratic cosmopolitans here.  I believe there are depeer flaws in their 
accounts, hence my uninterest in challenging them on this point.
15 Habermas 2010: 270.
16 See Walzer 2015.
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traditional meaning of  citizenship as well as the practical and ethical justifications for borders in 
liberal societies wherein the idea of  human right serves as a foundational legal concept.17
As individual states become increasingly beholden to these forces, so too does popular 
sovereignty become increasingly threatened so long as the state remains the form through which it 
must be realized.18  In addition, the mode in which this sovereignty has historically been expressed—
in an aggressive outward projection of  "hard power" (e.g. military force)—is itself  being replaced by 
"soft power," the use of  such means as persuasion and the control of  information as the diplomatic 
modus operandi of  Western states.  This shift thus "robs the subjects Kant had counted on in his 
association of  free states of  the very basis for their independence."19  The primary obstacle to 
realizing Kant's vision of  cosmopolitan law—statist sovereignty—ends up being that which also fails 
to adequately realize the (popular) sovereignty that gave the statist form its normative force in Kant's 
theory.20
1.2 New Ideas of  Sovereignty and Citizenship in Cosmopolitan Democracy 
So Kant's vision of  a cosmopolitan legal order failed because he couldn't see beyond the 
statist horizon of  sovereignty that dominated his historical context.  And it is also precisely within 
this horizon where sovereignty has been undermined, as contemporary global forces thwart 
traditional attempts at sovereign self-assertion.  Hence the detrimental elements of  the statist 
conception—its particularist (territorial/geographic, ethnic, religious) constitutive elements—are, in 
17 See Benhabib 2004 and 2007.
18 See Held 1997, 2005, and 2010; Brown 2010; Benhabib 2004 and 2007; and Habermas 1997, 2008, and 
2010.
19 Habermas 1997: 123.
20 It is important to note now, though, that recognizing the inadequacy of state sovereignty does not commit 
the democratic cosmopolitans to a wholesale denial of the state form’s moral or (temporary) practical significance.  
Habermas (2008), for example, makes clear that states will almost certainly need to play a role (for historically 
contingent reasons) at the outset of any foreseeable cosmopolitan juridical order, insofar as they contribute to its 
democratic legitimation.  But it is also important to recognize that the new role for states in these accounts 
nevertheless fundamentally alters states’ central normative function, indeed presupposing the transformation of 
sovereignty I discuss in the next section.
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the democratic cosmopolitan accounts, replaced with a liberal-procedural vision of  generally 
accepted principles and procedures for governance that form the new locus of  a people's sovereign 
will or self-determination.  I find important at least two dimensions along which the theories 
reimagine the concept: (a) topological revisions and (b) procedural-representative ones.  The former 
concern the topology of  the statist sovereignty concept—the internal/external, domestic/foreign 
distinctions constitutive of  the concept—and thus directly pertain to how contemporary global 
forces dissolve such distinctions.  The latter revise the processes through which sovereign 
representation is expressed, fitting it within sovereignty's reimagined "vertical" topology.
1.2.1 Topological Revisions
What does it mean to say that those ecological-economic-demographic forces undermine 
statist sovereignty due to the concept's topology?  As we saw, the internal/external distinction is 
central to the meaning of  statist sovereignty.  This is why Finnemore calls foreign intervention a 
"liminal concept" for the idea of  sovereignty, as it "sets the outer limits of  its meaning" and thus 
provides its determinate content.21  The basic topology of  statist sovereignty is this division between 
the internal and external because it is through this distinction that the sense of  "self-determination" 
is formed—a people (the internal) expressing its will against those forces pressing in from without 
(the external).  The problem, then, is that ecological collapse, the dynamics of  global capitalism, and 
mass displacements of  peoples dissolve this distinction.
The contemporary topological weaknesses of  statist sovereignty can be thought of  
practically and theoretically.  The dissolution of  the internal/external distinction manifests along 
ecological, economic, and demographic fault-lines, although these are all ideal types and mutually 
involved.  Ecological crises, to start, can only be managed effectively by great or near-great powers, 
and even so, no great power acting alone could avoid the crises spawned by the steady march of  
21 See Finnemore 2003.  By “determinate content” I mean here, e.g., what policies the international system 
permits a state to pursue, i.e., the zone (of actions) of a state’s legitimate sovereign authority.
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climate change.  Because all states are (to varying degrees) both responsible for and subject to 
ecological crises, the political space these crises open transcends the internal/external, domestic/
foreign distinctions.  Something similar can be said about the political-economic dynamics of  global 
capitalism.  Multinational corporations are a good example of  the concrete forces blurring these 
distinctions, as they are both internal and external to the nations in which they operate, often 
capable of  exerting more influence over domestic and international policy than most states could.  It 
makes sense, then, that the economic crisis appears as a kind of  phantasm, simultaneously reaching 
into the most basic economic life of  a state while also looming above and beyond it, external to it, a 
new kind of  "foreign threat."  FDR's declaration of  "war against this depression" in his 1933 
inaugural address—22a declaration of  war and marshaling of  the state apparatus against a domestic 
economic crisis—is an archetypal example of  how the blurring between the internal and external 
manifests in practical state policy.23
In response to this blurring of  the distinction constitutive of  statist sovereignty, 
cosmopolitan democracy reimagines sovereignty with a vertical topology.  This "vertical division" of  
sovereignty takes the basic idea of  federalism from the United States as a loose model for a future 
cosmopolitan supranational government.  Individuals would exist in a network of  overlapping 
institutions, the highest global level responsible for managing issues like those ecological, economic, 
and demographic ones mentioned above, with global peacekeeping an essential additional function.  
The basic federalist idea, moreover, seems at first to avoid looking like a world state by dispersing 
governmental authority across different vertical "levels," be they local, provincial, regional, global.  
"What I am proposing," writes Thomas Pogge, "is not the idea of  a centralized world state... [r]ather, 
the proposal is that governmental authority—or sovereignty—be widely dispersed in the vertical 
22 See Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933.
23 Scheuerman (2004, p. 175) discusses how the distinction between a country’s foreign and domestic 
economic policy has become blurred over this period of the internationalization of the liberal legal-economic model.
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dimension."24  Institutions representing large global regions (similar to the European Union) would, 
first, be created where they didn't already exist and, moreover, their decisions "recognized, in 
principle, as legitimate independent sources of  law."25  With this disassociation of  sovereignty from 
fundamentally particularist forms, the new political space opened by global issues need not 
necessarily undercut popular sovereignty; international organizations would exist possessing the 
proper size, scope, and authority to deal with the ecological, economic, and demographic issues that 
defy spatio-territorial constraints.  While there are unsurprisingly a great number of  differences in 
the specific institutional arrangements the democratic cosmopolitan theorists imagine, nevertheless 
there is a generic "three level" global system that encompasses the general project: (1) a highest-level 
supranational organization that at the minimum maintains security between nations; (2) transnational 
organizations coordinating ecological, economic, and demographic policy; and (3) the remnants of  
those democratically legitimate states and/or nations at the "lowest" level (of  the major three) that 
conducts local policy consonant with that set out by the larger cosmopolitan institutions.26
For now I want to put aside myriad questions concerning the practical functioning of  this 
"verticalized sovereignty" concept and the cosmopolitan institutions that would embody it, questions 
about, e.g., the managing of  the peacekeeping force, the degree to which higher levels control the 
lowers' policies, who arbitrates disputes between the levels, etc.  Regardless of  such questions, the 
new verticalized sovereignty at least in theory avoids several problems caused by its old statist 
topology.  First, institutions capable of  addressing issues that cut across current borders would 
ensure the popular sovereignty of  those peoples that could not fully grapple with said issues 
themselves.  No longer beholden to the often mercurial wills of  other nations, the world's peoples 
could now appeal to a genuine legal authority to coordinate response to acute ecological or economic 
24 Pogge 2010: 120.
25 Held 1997: 247.
26 See Habermas 2008 (esp. pp. 451-3) and Held 2010.
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crises.  And, perhaps most important, the problem of  nations going to war with each other would 
now become a legal one, as the prevention of  war becomes a central institutional task of  the highest 
level of  cosmopolitan government.
1.2.2 Representative Revisions
Yet eventually we must ask: how will popular sovereignty be expressed in its new vertical 
form?  That is, what account of  sovereign representation do these accounts offer whereby the 
transnational institutions come to be seen as legitimate sources of  law?  The second dimension of  
the democratic cosmopolitan revisions—their account of  representation—attempts to answer this 
question.
We should note first that the problem of  representation isn't uncomplicated within the 
familiar statist form of  sovereignty.  Again, the aforementioned three ideal-type global issues present 
problems practical and theoretical.  Mass displacements of  peoples are, in particular, a novel 
challenge to the traditional liberal idea of  citizenship.27  First, fundamental principles of  Western 
liberal law attribute sets of  basic rights to all individuals merely in virtue of  their being human, their 
humanity.  Such rights open up a new kind of  political space—however limited—to non-citizens 
living alongside or within a nationally organized community.  Originally, Kant imagined that the 
world public created by such co-habitation (which is yet another blurring of  the internal/external 
distinction) would naturally drive humanity toward the creation of  a world republic.28  The 
quintessential cosmopolitan right for Kant is unsurprisingly the "right to hospitality,"29 the right to 
travel and engage in the socio-economic life of  another state.  But Kant didn't resolve the tension 
between a state's obligation to hospitality and its right to control its domestic borders, i.e., its internal 
27 Seyla Benhabib has provided perhaps the most impressive sustained discussion of this problem from the 
democratic cosmopolitan theoretical perspective.  See Benhabib 2004, 2007, and 2014.
28 See Kant 1795.
29 See Kant 1797.
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policy, a tension we see today between international human rights laws and treaties and increasingly 
contentious national immigration policies.  In all fairness, though, Kant couldn't have foreseen or 
imagined anything like the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis: not the magnitude of  people displaced, nor 
the capabilities and contentious ethico-legal obligations of  the advanced industrial states responding 
to it, and certainly not the dynamics of  the isolationist–cosmopolitan divisions we see today both 
within and among states.  Like the blurring of  the distinction between domestic and foreign 
economic policy, boundaries between the legal and socio-economic meanings of  citizenship and 
non-citizenship shift in ways that throw politics into confusion.  Cultural and legal schisms have 
arisen around a host of  related issues, like the basic rights refugees and economic migrants should 
have; the number of  migrants a state should tolerate/accommodate; and, ultimately, the question of  
whether certain groups even "belong" at all in their (new? or temporary?) state.
"Transnational migrations," says Benhabib, thus "bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma 
at the heart of  liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand 
and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other."30  National identity has 
accordingly become a fault-line for deep political-philosophical fractures.  Political conflict about 
national identity and immigration are nothing new, of  course, at least in American history.31  But the 
intensity and scope of  these conflicts have reached a fever pitch in recent years, not least because of  
the increased visibility mass media has given to such demographic and cultural disruptions.  Mass 
human displacements affect every element of  a national identity, whether religious, ethnic, cultural, 
etc., turning what were once fundamental political credences into centers of  political conflict.  In 
this new political space cosmopolitan theorists have called great attention to the contingency of  the 
"national essences" often underlying notions of  national identity.32  "There is only a historically 
30 Benhabib 2004: 2.
31 Eric Kaufmann’s Whiteshift (2018) details this history at length.
32 See Appiah 2018.
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contingent connection between the principles underpinning citizenship and the national 
community," says Held, and hence the principles of  citizenship warrant "re-articulation" and "re-
entrench[ment]."33  What the legitimate cosmopolitan government(s) must now represent are not 
particular peoples—defined by their territory, ethnicity, religion, etc.—but humanity as such, 
embodied in certain universally valid principles and procedures recognized as such by those 
particular peoples the institutions represent.  I do not mean that the institutions imagined by the 
cosmopolitan theorists will not take such particularist identities seriously; indeed, the idea of  
regional transnational institutions requires informed distinctions between regions and peoples that 
take into account their histories, cultures, and material circumstances.  But the important theoretical 
move is that the particularist identifications will no longer be foundational to the concept of  
citizenship or political authority generally.  Unlike past conceptions of  popular representation and its 
state conduits, cosmopolitan governance does away with the contingent, “mythological” unities 
constitutive of  the territorially/ethnically/nationally bounded absolute right of  states that conflicts 
with cosmopolitanism's universalistic liberal principles.34
The statist topology of  sovereignty (the internal/external distinction) required a 
correspondingly exclusive idea of  citizenship in order for self-determination (popular sovereignty) to 
have determinate meaning; without an Other clearly distinguishable from a state's citizens, the 
collective subject of  self-determination is thrown into ambiguity.  Cosmopolitanism's vertical 
sovereignty, if  it is to abandon the particularist foundations of  the concept, must then be built on 
correspondingly non-exclusive, i.e., universal, criteria for political membership.  Because 
cosmopolitanism demands not only "world citizens" but a world wherein all are citizens,35 the 
33 Held 2010: 307.
34 See Held 2005, especially p. 167, for a particularly clear and forceful statement of this view.
35 Hannah Arendt (1973) popularized this notion of “the right to have rights” as the central moral-juridical 
problem concerning stateless peoples.  This right to have rights amounts to a right to citizenship, for as Arendt (and 
many others) experienced, human rights remain unrealizable outside a kind of juridical context currently only found 
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foundations of  cosmopolitan citizenship must be "general rules and principles which can be 
entrenched and drawn upon in diverse settings."36  The rules and principles are, of  course, principles 
of  human rights and the cosmopolitan lex suprema, the permanent suspension of  states’ jus ad bellum, 
their right to go to war.  Being a cosmopolitan citizen means existing in a legal order wherein all 
humanity enjoys basic rights and participates in governance across a potentially wide array of  
institutions and communities; the cosmopolitan citizen would, in this way, take on multiple 
citizenships corresponding to those issues and communities affecting them.37  
The alternative model of  citizenship is self-defeating, so the cosmopolitan theorists say, 
because the distinctions upon which it must rest have been and continue to be rendered obsolete.  
Only a universal citizenship is capable of  representing the peoples of  a world wherein deteriorating 
ecology, unpredictable technologies and economies, and mass human displacement have made 
isolation a practical impossibility.  Cosmopolitanism thus "constitutes the political basis and political 
philosophy of  living in a global age."38  Indeed, the world has become so interconnected and issues 
so far-reaching, they argue, that cosmopolitan democracy is the only form of  government capable of  
realizing (liberal) democracy and popular sovereignty.39
1.3 “Learning Processes” as a Key Explanatory Mechanism in Cosmopolitan Theory
Now we arrive at a decisive point in the democratic cosmopolitan account.  Having supplied (a) the 
topological structure of  its concept of  sovereignty, as well as (b) the principles underlying a 
cosmopolitan citizenship, it must now give an account of  (c) how such an order—a genuine legal 
within states.  For an essay on Arendt’s notion of the “right to have rights,” see Benhabib’s “‘The right to have 
rights’: Hannah Arendt on the contradictions of the nation-state,” in Benhabib 2004.
36 Held 2010: 306.
37 See Held 2005 and 2010; Habermas 2008; and Pogge 1992.
38 Held 2005: 167.
39 See, among others, Habermas 2006, 2008, and 2010; Held 1997, 2005, and 2010; and Benhabib 2004, 
2007, and 2014.
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order—would be and become democratically legitimate, i.e, how the peoples within it would see it as 
realizing their right to self-determination.  For if  the cosmopolitan juridical order failed in this last 
regard, then the accounts I have discussed here would not have moved beyond Kant's original 
problem of  articulating a universal law that did not violate the plurality of  existing polities and their 
right to self-determination.  This last question is, moreover, twofold: first is the question of  what 
self-determination is in theory for the cosmopolitan citizen; second, how the world’s peoples would 
transition from their predominant statist understanding of  citizenship toward the cosmopolitan one.
If  the cosmopolitan theorists are correct in their diagnosing statist sovereignty and 
citizenship as terminally ill-suited for the present global situation; and, importantly, if  we recognize 
this point; then where else can we turn to but cosmopolitanism’s universalistic principles to realize 
our right to self-determination if  no particularist foundations are up to the task?  “The issue,” writes 
Habermas, “is whether we must finally bid farewell to the very idea of  constitutional democracy or 
whether the normative core of  the vanishing world of  democratic nation-states can be recovered 
within the post-national constellation.”40  Hence cosmopolitan citizens would, accordingly, “take 
their orientations from universalistic standards” of  human right and world peace, standards 
institutionally embodied in and realized by a future cosmopolitan world organization.41  This 
“constitutional patriotism”42 would thus replace those old particularist identities that merely 
contingently underlie our ideas of  sovereignty and citizenship.  But “constitutional patriotism” could 
not fully replace those ideas because, first, in doing so it would dissolve the pluralism that is both the 
starting point of  cosmopolitan theory as well as the condition a cosmopolitan legal order must 
respect if  it is to be democratically legitimate.  Second, the general architecture of  a cosmopolitan 
legal order as proposed calls for regional and sub-regional institutions (including juridically 
40 Habermas 2010: 274.
41 Habermas 2008: 447.
42 See Habermas 1996, esp. p. 499.
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subordinated nation-states) to supplement the overarching supranational one; and so a modified 
form of  national citizenship still remains in the cosmopolitan account, chiefly to make use of  the 
processes of  democratic legitimation some existing states embody.43
The development of  the cosmopolitan legal order encounters here yet another obstacle, the 
product of  the theory’s inability to fully banish a particularist form of  citizenship (however 
juridically subordinated) from its proposed legal architecture.  The practical dimension of  the 
problem concerns how present world opinion is to move away from a particularist/statist idea of  
sovereignty and citizenship toward a suitably cosmopolitan one.  Crucially, brute coercion is not an 
available option, as it wasn’t for Kant, due to the normative core of  the theory as it has been 
imagined.44  The cosmopolitan theorists are quite clear on this point.45  The creation of  a 
cosmopolitan legal order must occur consensually, and so some kind of  permissibly (non-)coercive 
mechanism for its realization must be identified.  More will be said about this problem shortly.  But 
first I will introduce its theoretical counterpart, which Habermas calls a “major gap” in the 
cosmopolitan legal account.  His comments are worth quoting at length:
[This gap] primarily concerns the legitimate expectations and demands of  citizens in their 
contrasting roles as cosmopolitan and national citizens.  Cosmopolitan citizens take their 
orientation from universalistic standards which the peace and human rights policies of  the 
United Nations must satisfy no less than a global domestic politics negotiated among global 
players.  National citizens, by contrast, measure the conduct of  their governments and chief  
negotiators in these international arenas in the first instance not by global standards of  justice 
but above all by the effective observance of  national or regional interests.  But if  this conflict 
were fought out in the heads of  the same citizens, the notions of  legitimacy that evolved 
within the cosmopolitan framework of  the international community would inevitably clash 
with the legitimate expectations and demands derived from the frame of  reference of  the 
respective nation-states.46
43 See Habermas 2008 and Held 2005.
44 Below (2.2.1) I discuss the meaning of coercion and its role in accounts of cosmopolitan law in greater 
detail.
45 Held 1997: 245.
46 Habermas 2008: 449.
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This problem of  a “split consciousness” in the minds of  future cosmopolitan citizens, we should 
note, appears (to Habermas) even after ideas of  a cosmopolitan sovereignty and citizenship have 
“evolved” in the international community, and would thus also appear within this initial stage of  
“evolution” as well.  So this split consciousness problem is not wholly separable from the above 
practical problem.  The solution to both problems that the cosmopolitan theorists mobilize is built 
upon a notion of  cosmopolitan learning processes, an explanatory mechanism that acts as a theoretical 
fulcrum for the rest of  the cosmopolitan legal project.  Now we must see how this notion appears in 
the different accounts I’ve referenced so far.
Habermas directly appeals to “learning processes” to explain the “constitutionalization of  
international law,” his term for the world transition to cosmopolitan law.  “From the perspective of  a 
politically constituted world society,” he writes, “both governments and populations would have to 
adopt new orientations and in this sense ‘learn.’”47  Although he recognizes that states today are far 
from living up to the “historical learning processes” that emerged as the post-WWII order took 
shape, nascent cosmopolitan institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union 
(EU) evidence the continuing possible development of  this cosmopolitan Geist.  We can think of  the 
different kinds of  learning this transformation requires in terms of  the two different subjects of  
cosmopolitan law: states (governments) and individuals (peoples).  States (and future regional 
governments) will have to adapt their range of  legitimate action to those policies in line with the 
cosmopolitan commitments to peace and human rights.  The structure of  the EU, with its vertical 
division of  law- and policy-making, illustrates how states can take on new roles wherein they 
become “fallible agent[s] of  the world [European] community.”48  Under the threat of  sanction from 
the EU, individual European states have, to a significant extent, organized their domestic law around 
cosmopolitan principles while nevertheless still retaining their monopoly on violence.  We should 
47 Habermas 2008: 453.
48 Habermas 2008: 453.
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note that the origins of  this nascent European cosmopolitanism were far from “consensual” or 
democratic, given the essential role the Second World War and the ensuing conflict between the first 
two superpowers played in this story.
Nevertheless, these institutions have proved enduring, all things considered.  But as recent 
years especially have taught us, an additional learning process must take place if  such cosmopolitan 
transformations are to continue their development toward genuine cosmopolitan law.  We have seen 
how the particularist notions of  citizenship and sovereignty can be mobilized against the 
cosmopolitan project even when they oppose consensus among governmental elites, which is what 
occurred in Britain’s dramatically prolonged exit from the EU.  So peoples must also undergo 
learning processes cultural, social, and political before a condition of  cosmopolitan law can be said 
to exist in an enduring way.  Cosmopolitan theorists see these particularist (nationalist, religious, 
ethnic) attitudes as “obstinate frame[s] of  mind,”49 historically contingent relics of  a normatively 
obsolete international order.  How a continued application of  current nascent cosmopolitan 
practices might lead to further development—rather than stagnation or reversal—remains unclear, 
especially if  states maintain their monopoly on legitimate force before their “obstinate” populations 
“learn.”  The cosmopolitan theorists adapt two ideas from Kant to explain how such a 
transformation might take place.
The first idea concerns how cosmopolitan law might develop among those states wherein its 
core principles have already “taken root.”  According to Kant, free trade and laws of  hospitality 
guaranteeing the right to travel and interact with foreigners will create a broader community of  
interests and a spirit of  camaraderie among those involved.50  The thought is that, if  different 
peoples nevertheless all live in the same “global public,” then a common morality—i.e., a 
cosmopolitan one—will develop among them.  So long as the conditions such a global public 
49 Habermas 2008: 453.  See also Held 2005 and 2010.
50 See Kant 1795.
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requires are maintained over some period, then we can expect to see a gradual transformation in the 
relations between these states and peoples toward cosmopolitan law.  Jeremy Waldron offers a 
similar idea in his account of  the “cosmopolitan thicket” of  interlocking laws, treaties, and norms 
currently at work in international politics.51  Although this thicket is of  course far from resembling a 
genuine cosmopolitan legal order, its very existence goes to show that, with the correct nourishing 
and care, further development along the cosmopolitan trajectory is possible.  Free trade and the 
opinions of  a global public can thus act as a “healthy soil” in which other principles and laws can 
eventually take root.  Given the proper environment, the world’s peoples can thus come to learn a 
cosmopolitan morality.
These conditions, however, are only those necessary for a cosmopolitan transformation to take 
place where a nascent cosmopolitanism already exists.  While we already see a version of  this order in 
Europe and North America, the question remains as to how non-citizens and other peoples will 
come to be incorporated within it.  Seyla Benhabib attempts to answer this crucial question with her 
idea of  “democratic iterations.”  Benhabib takes the developments in European democracy over the 
last three-quarters of  a century to suggest that there is something inherent in democratic political 
processes themselves that mediates between local moralities and cosmopolitan norms, “between 
universal norms and the will of  democratic majorities.”52  Taking up Kant’s idea that states with 
certain republican constitutions have a natural affinity to cooperate, she claims that repeated 
modifications of  law through democratic processes produces a “jurisgenerative politics” that 
gradually incorporates and encompasses non-citizens and outsiders.  In the process, a cosmopolitan 
idea of  citizenship is supposed to emerge.  Examples of  such jurisgenerative politics, Benhabib 
points out, can be found in how the EU and its member states have gradually increased the rights of  
non-citizens and, moreover, have led efforts to extend such measures in the international arena 
51 Waldron 2006.




I’ll now summarize all the moving parts I’ve discussed so far.  The democratic cosmopolitan 
theorists have given us an account of  how genuine cosmopolitan law could rightfully emerge from 
our present situation.  These accounts try to overcome the failures and obstacles that Kant’s account 
faced by reimagining the concepts of  sovereignty and citizenship.  Kant could only offer a facsimile 
legal cosmopolitanism because his statist understanding of  these concepts prevented him from 
imagining a realistic alternative to states as the highest existing legal authorities.  The cosmopolitans 
overcame this first obstacle by providing a universalistic model of  sovereignty and citizenship, so 
that in theory the plurality of  peoples could be respected while united in a single cosmopolitan legal 
order.  But here they confront a new problem arising, first, from the fact that our present pluralist 
condition is one in which the “historically obstinate” understandings of  sovereignty and citizenship 
still predominate; and second, from their inability to utilize coercion as a mechanism for creating a 
cosmopolitan legal order, for bridging this gap between these current understandings and the 
cosmopolitan ones awaiting their realization.
To bridge this gap the theorists all introduce “learning processes” as the mechanism that 
explains how a non-coercive (i.e., consensual and democratically legitimate) cosmopolitan 
transformation could occur in our present condition.  The move from cosmopolitan theory to 
cosmopolitan law, they say, can take place through some combination of  the following.  First, a 
continued application of  those existing nascent cosmopolitan laws and institutions can produce the 
conditions required for peoples to “learn” cosmopolitan principles—nourishing a "cosmopolitan 
thicket" of  international norms and laws—and engender this learning among those involved 
populations.  The post-WWII liberal order built on free trade, commerce, and the resultant global 
26
public is the exemplary historical instance of  such learning processes for the cosmopolitans.  But for 
a genuine cosmopolitan law to emerge there must also be an account of  how this order would 
expand to include non-citizens and other peoples.  Here the learning processes are found in a 
particular idea of  democratic politics acting as a bridge between local moralities and universal 
cosmopolitan principles.  Through “democratic iterations” different peoples can be gradually united 
in a cosmopolitan legal order, as such iterations present an opportunity for them to “learn” 
cosmopolitan principles through their domestic enacting of  them alongside others.  Learning 
processes, then, are the cosmopolitans’ answer to the paradoxes Kant confronted when he tried to 
think how plurality might be respected when united under a universal law.
2 SOME DILEMMAS FOR LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM
The democratic cosmopolitans believe those obstacles to establishing cosmopolitan law are only 
“complex coordination problems” which do not present a “real dilemma” for the future of  legal 
cosmopolitanism.53  I disagree.  Though the obstacles may very well be kinds of  coordination 
problems, they are certainly not only that.  The problem Rousseau brings to our attention in his story 
of  the stag hunt, for example, isn’t merely that of  coordinating the hunting party—rather, it is the 
structural problem of  how we can even imagine cooperation among self-interested individuals in the absence of  a force 
to correct any errant, self-interested behavior.54  But we must remember that cosmopolitans have foreclosed 
the coordinating force available to Rousseau as a potential solution to this problem: the creation of  a 
sovereign.  Indeed, the entire exercise in developing accounts of  “learning processes” is not an 
attempt to solve the analogous “coordination problem” among self-interested states in the 
53 Brown 2010b: 260.
54 See Rousseau 2011.
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international arena, but instead an attempt to dissolve the assumptions underlying it; namely, the 
assumptions of  statist sovereignty and particularist citizenships that constituted the cosmopolitan 
dilemma as Kant confronted it.  In this way learning processes are the mechanism through which 
the international community is to be transformed in a way that bypasses the traditional 
understanding of  international anarchy.55
2.1 The Peculiar Nature of  Cosmopolitan “Learning Processes”
I think there are a couple problems with how the cosmopolitans use learning processes to explain 
the genesis of  cosmopolitan law.  It’s important, though, to point out that “learning” can be quite an 
ambiguous concept.  All learning is a kind of  process, but we have to specify the kind of  learning 
we’re talking about here.  Learning the rules to a board game is different than learning how to live a 
certain kind of  way with others.  Several people from quite different cultures (I think it’s safe to 
assume) could probably figure out the rules to a board game they’re all trying to play, so long as 
there isn’t a significant language barrier.  They share a practical goal (we assume each is intent on 
playing the board game, or is compelled to) and they have the means to carry it out, namely their 
sociability and their cognition.  So long as nothing actively interferes with the process, it seems 
reasonable to say that the group will play the game by undergoing a collective “learning process.”  
The sociological and conceptual structures this requires are all accounted for, and so appealing to 
learning processes to explain how they will eventually come to play the game together seems cogent.
Is this, then, the sense in which the cosmopolitans use “learning processes” in their theories?  
There are important similarities.  They provide a compelling case for why the predominant meanings 
of  sovereignty and citizenship have been rendered inadequate in today’s world.  At the very least the 
55 This kind of transformation is discussed at length by constructivist scholars of international relations.  
See Alexander Wendt (1992), “Anarchy is what States Make of it,” and Helen Milner (1991), “The Assumption of 
Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.”
28
concepts need revising, and it’s plausible that the cosmopolitans are right to claim that any 
particularist foundations for these concepts will prove to be fatal flaws.  Moreover, the global issues 
responsible for this shift are, in a way, “universal” problems confronting all the world’s peoples, 
much like how every player must confront the same challenges in a board game.  So if  the world is 
to “play” this “game” without sacrificing in toto a liberal-democratic understanding of  popular 
sovereignty and citizenship,56 then it must “learn” the new cosmopolitan rules to the game, i.e., the 
cosmopolitan ideas of  sovereignty and citizenship.  At least this is what the cosmopolitans seem to 
say.
If  someone is playing a game wrong, we are likely to correct them; and because they 
presumably want to play it correctly, they will likely just thank us for pointing out their error.  Or 
perhaps they firmly believe they understood the rules correctly, and so the rulebook or some online 
forums might have to be consulted.  At worst someone intentionally plays incorrectly (cheats) and 
we have to find someone else to play with.  The first major problem with the cosmopolitans’ idea of  
learning processes is that they don’t function like the ones in this hypothetical game.  First, there is a 
necessary indeterminacy in the “rules” that peoples must learn—i.e., how to live together in the 
context of  certain global issues—because we can only imagine such learning as democratic if  what is 
learned is the result of  consensual interaction and cooperation, as it is in Benhabib’s idea of  
“democratic iterations.”  If  we can specify the exact rules that need to be learned beforehand—
before we come together to play the game—then deliberation and compromise with peoples in a 
“historically obstinate frame of  mind” can only lead to an undemocratic paternalism, on the one 
hand, or a distortion and erring from the cosmopolitan principles around which the world must be 
organized, on the other.  Even if  we assume that such peoples would learn in the minimum sense of  
coming to see that some kind of  institutionalization of  cosmopolitan principles must occur, the other 
56 See Habermas 2008.
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kind of  “learning”—figuring out what such arrangements would look like in particular 
circumstances—must still take place.  And we ought not assume that agreement would appear here, 
as different peoples with their own interests would almost certainly have different (and thus 
potentially incompatible) ideas about what sorts of  cosmopolitan institutional arrangements they 
would be willing to tolerate.  The subject matter of  this learning-how to live with one another lacks the 
kind of  objectivity found in, say, the rules to a board game, an objectivity that enables “learning 
processes” to function as a real explanatory mechanism there.
The cosmopolitans recognize, to a degree, the need for this kind of  objectivity when they 
emphasize that realizing the new cosmopolitan paradigm depends on its core principles of  
democracy and human rights being “available” and “clear” for all to see.57  Putting aside the myriad 
meta-ethical questions this raises—like, for example, whether such principles can even be 
“objective” in this way, what that would even mean, etc.—such comments nevertheless still evince 
an essential ambiguity in the cosmopolitan account.  On the one hand, cosmopolitan principles and 
the cosmopolitan legal project purportedly enjoy a kind of  “objective ethical necessity” that could 
come to be consensually “seen” or “learned” by the world’s peoples if  the structures such learning 
requires—e.g., a global public, rights of  hospitality, open commerce and free trade, interconnected 
democratic political processes, etc.—are cultivated and maintained.  But on the other hand, what 
exactly is to be learned is left ambiguous in order to preserve the possibility that such learning will 
proceed consensually, for the meaning of  "consensual" and what it will look like will inevitably vary 
from people to people. 
I’m not saying that this kind of  learning is impossible, or that we have no reason to expect it 
ever to happen.  In some way and for some indeterminate time it did in fact happen, as the 
cosmopolitans point out, among the states that founded, entrenched, and expanded the post-WWII 
57 Held 2010: 307.
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liberal order across the last half-century.  The problem, though, is that in order for this learning to 
serve as a foundation for a genuine legal order, there must be some corrective force that operates 
when someone playing the game “forgets” what they’ve learned, or still continues (for whatever 
reason) to play improperly.  Cosmopolitanism, however, cannot appeal to the traditional corrective 
force—a sovereign—because the genesis of  this force—the force of  genuine cosmopolitan law—is 
what “learning processes” are supposed to explain!  Instead, the cosmopolitans must find a corrective force 
lurking within the very democratic learning processes themselves, but so far they’ve only offered an 
underdeveloped sociology58 to support such a claim.  Kant appealed to a natural teleology operating 
in republican states to explain why, over time, we can expect the cosmopolitan spirit to develop 
among them.  An even stranger natural teleology, though, is required to explain how this 
development would come to incorporate those states and peoples outside these orders, not to 
mention why those outside would enter willingly.
The past couple decades have cast more doubt on cosmopolitan learning processes taking 
place in the way cosmopolitans think they will.  Indeed, faced with precisely the kind of  questions 
for which Benhabib develops her idea of  “democratic iterations”—questions concerning the 
meaning of  citizenship, of  incorporating those outside a polity within it, etc.—Great Britain and the 
United States, as just two examples, have chosen to turn their backs on the kind of  cosmopolitan 
principles and institutions they purportedly learned over the past half-century.  “There is no 
guarantee that ‘learning’ is irreversible,” writes Raymond Geuss, pithily capturing the central issue; 
“nor can any distinct sense be attributed to the claim that learning in the long term is natural, that is, 
will take place unless prevented.”59  What’s needed to prevent such a backslide, I repeat, is a coercive 
force—a kind of  law—that lies out of  reach precisely when the idea of  a learning process must be 
invoked in the cosmopolitan accounts.  Paraphrasing Kenneth Waltz, if  the end we seek is a 
58 Brown 2010b: 264.
59 Geuss 2008: 5.
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cosmopolitan legal order, and if  the basis for such an order is a network of  “learning processes” 
emanating from a certain kind of  democratic politics, “then some active agency must be substituted 
for the spontaneously functioning evolutionary forces whenever those forces seem to bog down.”60  
The cosmopolitans don’t give us compelling reasons to think that peoples, when confronted with 
global issues like mass migrations, ecological collapse, and economic crises will choose to enact or 
continue to practice cosmopolitan politics, a politics that is often held responsible, rightly or 
wrongly, for these issues even appearing in the first place.
2.1.1 A comment on consent, coercion, and cosmopolitan learning
Until now I’ve left open a crucial ambiguity: what counts as illegitimate coercion in these 
cosmopolitan learning processes?  That is, what exactly are the boundaries between consent and 
coercion, so that we can distinguish between a cosmopolitan “slightly visible hand” that justifiably 
pushes the learning processes along and one that pushes too hard?  This question is an important 
one because the answer to it will determine what, if  any, “corrective forces” might in fact be 
available to the cosmopolitans, so that they might fill the central explanatory gap in their notion of  
learning processes I pointed out above.  The traditional corrective force—the coercive, violent force 
of  law—is from the outset out of  bounds.  What would most closely approach this corrective force 
in today’s international politics—the armed intervention—is also quite clearly out of  bounds, as not 
respecting the consent constraints on the establishment of  cosmopolitan law.61  The force of  arms is 
not a legitimate way to correct errant learning processes, at least according to the cosmopolitan 
accounts as they now stand.  This much should be clear.  The threat of  sanctions as found in the 
European Union appear to be legitimate, but we must remember that the EU, although imperfect(ly 
cosmopolitan), is nevertheless an already existing supranational organization.  So the sanctions it 
60 Waltz 2001: 109.
61 Barring extreme cases, of course, like genocide; but these are cases wherein armed intervention serves to 
protect another people from a violence preceding the intervention, so at least in theory such cases are justified.
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metes out have, in a way, already been deemed legitimate by the member states to whom such 
sanctions might apply.  But again, we are not just asking about coercion within an existing 
cosmopolitan organization; we are trying to discover what this might look like in a legitimate process 
of  its creation.  How are the learning processes leading to the cosmopolitan transformation to be 
legitimately “corrected” when they go awry?
The different parts of  the cosmopolitan account come together here to render this boundary 
essentially ambiguous, or so I will now argue.  To see why we must return to the beginning, but just 
for a moment.  Recall how, for Kant, the cosmopolitan dilemma arose from the disanalogous pre-
civil and international states of  nature, the two different conditions of  war.  In the pre-civil case, 
coercing others into a legal order is justifiable because without this kind of  order a condition of  
right is impossible.  But when it comes to other states and peoples, the external, international state 
of  war, such coercion becomes unjustifiable because some condition of  right already exists internally, 
within different states.  And it was precisely this internal/external, i.e. statist, distinction which 
prevented Kant from transcending the plurality of  states and giving an account of  the genesis of  
cosmopolitan law.  So long as we remain within the statist horizon, then, the boundaries between 
coercion and consent in this context are relatively stable.  Coercion amounts to violating another 
state’s sovereignty—e.g. deploying armed force against their territory—whereas consensual inter-
state policy amounts to making use of  the limited socio-economic agreements of  a hypothetical 
voluntary league to change another’s behavior.  Because states have the prerogative to enter and exit 
from such voluntary agreements—as well as the voluntary league itself—then any state or group of  
states also has the prerogative to make such agreements conditional on others behaving in a certain 
way.
Here we see another consequence of  the dissolution of  the internal/external distinction, 
now in the blurring of  the boundaries between consensual and coercive foreign policies.  The 
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cosmopolitans suspended the original dilemma Kant confronted by transcending the statist 
distinctions constitutive of  it.  But by doing so, I argue that it has become practically impossible to 
find a meaningful distinction between consensual and coercive “learning.”  Sure, some actions 
obviously fall on one side or the other.  Sending an army to forcibly change another state’s laws and 
attitudes to comport with cosmopolitan principles is quite clearly illegitimate coercion.  And asking 
said state in a global forum, mobilizing the social forces present there, is obviously permissible.  
(And thus also consensual, if  such appeals “correct” any errant “learning.”  In the next section I 
discuss whether such appeals and this global forum might be the kind of  corrective force the 
cosmopolitan account of  learning processes needs.)
But what about economic sanctions?  Remember that, according to the cosmopolitans, the 
dynamics of  global capitalism have overturned the ease with which Kant could see trade agreements 
between states as uncontroversially “voluntary” ones.  We need only glance at the controversies 
arising from implementations of  the “Washington Consensus” to see but one prominent historical 
example of  this transformation.  Habermas notes, though, how smaller states are much more likely 
to “learn,” i.e. “reorient” themselves to cosmopolitan principles, because they are much more 
beholden to the global economic forces than are larger states.62  But in this instance, “learning 
processes” only become more concrete explanatory mechanisms in virtue of  the distinction between 
consensual and coercive learning becoming less so.  As I briefly mentioned above, we can see a corresponding 
shift in the nature of  economic policy generally over the last hundred years that bears out this point.  
Two related trends are worth considering.  The first is the increasing indistinction between domestic 
and foreign economic policy, an indistinction that has resulted in policy measures once reserved for 
external (and thus wartime) threats “collapsing inward” on domestic legal orders.63  From the point 
62 Habermas 2008: 453.
63 See Scheuerman 2004, especially p. 175.  See also Scheuerman 2000 and Agamben 2005 for further 
discussion of this trend.
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of  view of  the state, however, these changes appear rather necessary; in an increasingly globalized 
economy, the economic crisis and the military crisis take on a similar appearance.  If  armed 
intervention to correct errant learning isn’t allowed (excepting extreme cases), then why should 
economic sanctions representing similar kinds of  damage, instability, and suffering be viewed 
differently?  Sure the scope of  the damage may vary, but mass unemployment, civil unrest, etc., 
present similar threats to the safety and welfare of  a nation as might armed intervention.  Moreover, 
armed conflict and economic instability often accompany one another, a fact which casts even more 
doubt on drawing a meaningful normative distinction between these two policies.
The cosmopolitan theorists, at the very least, need to articulate better what they mean to 
capture when they distinguish between consensual learning and illegitimate coercion.  As of  now it’s 
not at all clear what can ground such a distinction from the point of  view of  democratic 
cosmopolitanism and its core normative commitments.  Clarifying what policies are permitted by the 
theory will be necessary if  they are to supplement their central explanatory mechanism (learning 
processes) with the corrective forces it requires to function as such; that is, if  they are to explain 
how peoples and their governments are to overcome their current understandings of  sovereignty 
and citizenship and adopt cosmopolitan principles.  Now we will examine whether the cosmopolitan 
account of  those first kind of  learning processes—the learning that can be cultivated among 
already-existing-yet-nascent cosmopolitan governments and peoples—is on as firm a footing as it 
needs to be.
2.2 A Healthy “Cosmopolitan Thicket” in Unhealthy Soil?
The basis for the first kind of  learning that might take place—the cultivation of  the “cosmopolitan 
thicket” through international commerce and the regulative opinions of  a global public—is, I argue, 
not as firm as it needs to be.  The idea that increased interdependence will somehow naturally 
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produce cooperation, or better yet, result in those involved learning new political ideals, must 
confront the fact that as interdependence increases, so too does the potential for conflict.  
Cooperation presupposes the potential for conflict, as Robert Keohane tells us, because what need 
would there be for the world's peoples to cooperate if  they could pursue their interests in natural 
harmony?64  To be sure, this relationship between interdependence, cooperation, and conflict is no 
iron law; it no more posits an inevitable increase in conflict than it does cooperation.  But it does give 
us reason to question the role that interdependence and the learning it purportedly engenders play in 
the above accounts of  the genesis of  a cosmopolitan legal order.
 I see three prima facie plausible directions in which this cosmopolitan "slightly visible hand" 
could push.  Kant and the cosmopolitan theorists see forces at work leading toward a cosmopolitan 
legal order.  Those skeptical of  cosmopolitan politics see a much gloomier destination, namely, a 
world organization posing as cosmopolitan but which, in reality, merely serves the interests of  the 
powerful by providing a moral veneer to their imperial policies.65  The outcome discussed less often, 
because less dramatic, is a middlingly (proto-)cosmopolitan world like the one we find ourselves in 
now, beset by both statist and cosmopolitan politics.  The latter will occasionally live up to these 
principles but, more often, fails to do so on account of  weak institutions and, as always, those 
historically obstinate frames of  mind among the peoples and states involved.  
It's rather uncertain which outcome we'll see.  But even if  we don’t speculate, we can still 
assess whether some hypothetical conditions—such as free commerce and a global public sphere—
would act as more or less "healthy soil" in which to cultivate our thicket of  cosmopolitan law.  Free 
commerce, we should notice, take on two contradictory roles in this story.  While internationally it is 
supposed to create a community of  common interests, domestically it acts as one of  those novel 
global forces undermining popular sovereignty.  Perhaps “free trade” functions in an ideal sense in 
64 See Keohane 2005.
65 See Schmitt (2006) and (2007); and Rasch (1999-2000).
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the cosmopolitan account; that is, not as the unbridled dynamics of  an unregulated global capitalism, 
but of  a new kind of  economic system altogether.  If  this is the case, then the cosmopolitans must 
provide an account of  how the current economic system will be reformed so it can play this part in 
the cosmopolitan transformation.
Finally, what reason do we have to believe that the opinions of  a “global public” would serve 
as a corrective force, regulating the policies of  states and attitudes of  peoples toward a 
“cosmopolitan orientation”?66  In one sense, this idea is intuitively correct: the larger or more diverse 
one’s community of  discussion, then the chances of  being exposed to points of  view that can take 
one out of  their narrow or particularist frame of  mind seem larger as well.  But conditions of  
discussion domestically remain far from ideal, and it’s hard to see how widening the sphere of  
discussion would do anything to improve the current state of  affairs.  Raymond Geuss offers an 
amusing retort to those who find in discussion a specific moral force at work:
Discussions, even discussions that take place under reasonably favorable conditions, are not 
necessary enlightening, clarifying, or conducive to fostering consensus.  In fact, they just as 
often foster polemics, and generate further bitterness, rancor and division.  Just think of  
Brexit.  I get along with most people better the less I know about what they really think and 
feel.  Anyone who has had any experience of  discussions in the real world knows that they 
can get nowhere and peter out, they can cause people to become even more confused than 
they were at the outset and that they can lead to the hardening of  opinion and the formation 
of  increasingly rigid and impenetrable fronts between different parties.  The longer and 
more intense the discussion, the worse it can get.  This is precisely what motivated 
Habermas in the theory of  communicative action to appeal to the topos of  an “ideal speech 
situation” as a means for removing these difficulties.  However, it is not at all obvious that 
anyone who performs a speech act necessarily thereby “presupposes” that his current 
situation is to be evaluated vis-à-vis what would be decided in an ideal speech situation, nor 
that in such an ideal situation a consensus would necessarily be reached.67
Perhaps we should return to Thucydides to be reminded of  the essentially unpredictable courses 
that democratic processes of  discussion can take.68  While a wider, global audience may induce a 
66 See Habermas 2008 and 2010.
67 Geuss 2019.
68 See Orwin 1984.
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spirit of  cosmopolitanism among some, it could just as easily spark ressentiment and a reaction against 
cosmopolitanism among the interlocutors instead.
3 THINKING BEYOND DEMOCRACY
Whether statist or cosmopolitan, the idea of  (popular) sovereignty appears unclear at best under the 
shadow of  those novel global crises.  The democratic cosmopolitans, I think, have presented a 
compelling critique of  statist sovereignty while unfortunately encountering a kind of  conceptual 
impasse when trying to think beyond the concept.  In these final sentences I’ll first offer some 
thoughts on the nature of  this impasse, and end with what many might consider to be a radical 
suggestion—that we might have to think “beyond democracy” for establishing a cosmopolitan legal 
order—but one which we nevertheless ought consider.
To state it shortly, the problem the democratic cosmopolitan account runs into is the 
following: it tries to rework a central political concept—democracy—for conditions radically 
different than those in which our understanding of  the concept took shape.  Modern constitutional 
democracies emerged wholly wedded to notions of  discrete, particular peoples and territories that 
provided the form and substance for the new liberal-democratic political horizon, regardless of  how 
universalistic the rhetoric of  democracy appeared to be.  (Much of  this rhetoric can be attributed to 
the revolutionary force it provided to nascent democratic movements, movements which were very 
particularist despite the appearance of  their rhetoric.)  When democratic cosmopolitanism attempts 
to rethink the concept of  constitutional democracy unbounded from particularist anchors, it is 
forced to substitute a supposedly neutral educational process for the normatively untenable 
particulars that once provided substance to the democracy concept.  The problem, however, is that 
the apparently democratic or neutral nature of  such learning processes is in direct tension with the 
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universal, substantive telos or product such processes are supposed to produce: namely, a political 
community capable and willing to arrive at a particular consensus about certain core political 
principles (of  human rights, democracy, peace, etc.)
The problems democratic cosmopolitanism must internally resolve do not weaken its 
critique of  the particularist idea of  popular sovereignty, though.  Keeping a fraught concept because 
an alternative remains unproven would not be wise.  Hence I propose cosmopolitans move forward 
with their critique and minimize the weaknesses of  their account: that is, I think they ought to 
concede the democratic deficit of  their account and merely assert, in spite of  it, the necessity of  
transnational governance.  The goal should be to establish international institutions capable of  
dealing with and regulating those global issues of  climate change, unregulated capitalism, and mass 
human displacements, and then, once established, worry about how such institutions can be made 
democratically accountable; not to mention figuring out what “democratic accountability” can even 
look like or mean on a global scale.  But for all the time spent worrying about how cosmopolitan law 
can be created in a democratic way, those global issues—the ultimate threats to popular sovereignty—
march on, unrelenting.  The ideal of  popular sovereignty then might paradoxically require us to 
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